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Making Japanese Thought
More Intelligible to the West 
Arǌnas Gelǌnas Interviews Thomas P. Kasulis 
Arǌnas Gelǌnas: How did it begin? What was your motivation of choosing to 
study philosophy, seemingly such a “useless” discipline? 
Thomas P. Kasulis: I got interested in philosophy when I was in college because it 
allowed me to think about a lot of different things without focusing too narrowly on any 
one subject. I was interested in science, in religion, in literature, and in arts. Any of 
these things could have been specialties but with philosophy it seemed I could study 
anything. I could also study politics or ethics, a field of great social concern in 1960s 
America. So, I think that was one factor – philosophy was a way to avoid the 
specialization and to fulfil all my various curiosities.
Another thing is that I thought of myself as a quite emotional person. I thought 
philosophy, with its emphasis on rational clarity, would help me control those emotions 
so they could be channeled, rather than have them control me, leading me willy-nilly 
from one place to the next. 
And the third point about philosophy is that I felt that in modern society something 
is missing. Religion has stepped into the background and is no longer the driving force 
it used to be in Western society. But there are still basic spiritual needs, concerns, 
worries, problems, possibilities. I thought philosophy might be a way to address those 
issues without being committed to the metaphysical ideas in traditional religions that 
most people today find difficult to believe. 
AG: Why Yale? 
TK: There are a few reasons. One is that I grew up near Yale and it seemed to me 
like a place I would aspire to attend. My home was only about hundred kilometers from 
Yale.
Another reason is that when I was in high school, Yale offered a special program for 
high school students. Yale selected a number of high school students from all around 
the country and designed a summer program for them. Mainly these were the children 
from high schools in disadvantaged areas where they did not have the opportunities 
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some of the richer cities and richer schools would have. It gave them a chance to 
develop their potential. I became fond of Yale starting back in those days. 
And then the third thing is that, unlike some other places that I had a possibility of 
going to, Yale had a strong emphasis on the teacher-student relationship, even with 
undergraduates. Other schools, such as Harvard, emphasized the graduate relationship 
between the student and the faculty. Yale always had the tradition of being strong even 
with undergraduates, so I was attracted to that idea. The kind of community Yale has is 
somewhat modeled on the British university communities: Yale has a dozen 
undergraduate colleges and students live in those colleges, getting to know very closely 
their fellow students. Also, students can interact especially closely with the faculty 
affiliated with their college. All these things make Yale a very attractive place.
There was one final thing that everyone laughs at, but I think it is actually a very 
important criterion. When I narrowed my spectrum of colleges to three, I spent a week 
at each place and ate the food, and Yale had the best food! I thought that it was very 
important, and it turned out actually to be very important. We used to go to the dining 
hall at 5.30 and stay there until 8.00. Usually there would be twelve of us, from 
different parts of America and, in some cases, the world, and we would often be from 
various different fields and specializations. We’d sit round the table eating and talking 
about all kinds of subjects. Sometimes I think I learned more from my dinner 
conversations than I did in my classroom. So Yale turned out to be a very good choice. 
AG: In what way did you benefit most from your studies at Yale? Was it good 
classes, good library or good fellow students? Whom do you consider your mentor and 
who were the “big names”, the influential figures at Yale at your time of studies?
TK: Well, the library was tremendous! It was one of the two or three best libraries 
in America and it always had whatever I needed. So that was a major plus. In terms of 
my mentors, I had a few people who deeply affected me in one way or another. One 
was John Edwin Smith who is famous for the work he did in both American 
pragmatism and in the philosophy of religion. Both fields appealed to me a great deal. 
As for the pragmatists, theirs was the time of the great blossoming of American 
philosophy. Such thinkers as John Dewey, William James, George Herbert Mead, and 
Charles Sanders Peirce brought a distinctively American approach to philosophy. A 
hallmark of pragmatic philosophy was to interact with the everyday as well as with the 
theoretical. I think this ideal is America’s great contribution to the history of Western 
philosophy, but unfortunately, since the 1950s it has pretty much faded away in 
America. So-called neo-pragmatism is not at all the same thing because it is far too 
theoretical and not nearly practical enough. So I do not see it as a rebirth of pragmatism, 
but as yet another escape from it.
From John E. Smith I learned a great deal about American philosophy and the 
worldview behind the pragmatic approach. For the philosophy of religion, he and 
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William Christian were the ones to influence me a lot. The study of the philosophy of 
religion allowed me to tie together some of my early interests in both religion and 
philosophy. In the field of phenomenology, which included existential phenomenology, 
I was influenced by John N. Findlay and also Edward S. Casey and Karsten Harries. I 
had a strong interest in existentialism and phenomenology partly because of the times – 
I went to college in the sixties when it was easy to be an existentialist in America: there 
was all the political activity at that time. I was also intrigued by phenomenology as the 
way of getting at the nature of experiences such as religious experiences without 
committing oneself to a certain metaphysical set of presumptions. Phenomenology puts 
metaphysics in brackets while analyzing the experience. This struck me as a fascinating 
approach to analyzing religion. Also, there was Robert Brumbaugh who was a 
classicist in philosophy with special interests in the philosophy of education. His ideas 
on the philosophy of education influenced me later as a teacher. 
AG: Could you please specify more about the structure of the studies at Yale, the 
“technical” aspect? Like, what subjects did you learn from the first year on? 
TK: Well, my first two years as an undergraduate were filled with intense study in 
the liberal arts. We had classes strictly limited in size to twelve students. We very 
thoroughly went through the Western intellectual tradition in the first years. First year, 
we had courses in the history of Western philosophy, history of politics and political 
theory, history of Western literature, a mathematics course, and a science course. The 
second year was more a continuation of the history of Western philosophy and a 
continuation of the history of literature. Then we had the option to begin the study of 
various other fields like psychology or sociology or, in my case, religious studies. Then 
we had to round out the general studies with a few other courses: some courses in social 
sciences, some in humanities, some in natural sciences. Then we started concentrating 
on our majors for our final two undergraduate years. We took four or five courses at one 
time each semester. And three or four of these would be courses in philosophy. For 
example, I might have taken a course in ethics, a course in political and legal 
philosophy, a course in poetry – I was very much interested in poetry and I took two or 
three courses in modern Western poetry – and a couple of courses in theology and 
Biblical studies.
Then there would be courses that I took out of sheer curiosity, like, for instance, the 
course in ancient Egyptian and Babylonian mathematics! It was interesting to see how 
Egyptians developed geometry and Babylonians developed algebra in two different 
regions of the world. Yet, because of the separation of the cultures, these approaches 
were never combined until Descartes, thousands of years later, developed analytic 
geometry to combine geometry and algebra. One great joy as a student was our learning 
fairly quickly to read simple Babylonian mathematical texts. The texts were mainly 
numbers, of course. So, if you knew how to read numbers and the operations of basic 
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science and arithmetic, you could figure out the text. One day our professor – Professor 
Asgar Aaboe from Denmark – brought to class an actual clay tablet from Yale’s rare 
book collection of Babylonian culture. He asked us what it was. And we puzzled over it, 
because it was different from all the other Babylonian texts we had seen that had been 
so very clearly laid out. In this case all the columns in it were a little bit crooked and the 
numbers were a little bit uneven. Also the content was rather simple mathematical 
equations. We looked at it without knowing what to do next, and the professor said 
“work the problems!” We worked the first six or seven problems and they all turned out 
to have the same answer: “six”! Why would all these simple problems have the same 
answer? And then one of my fellow students suddenly realized what it was. He said it 
was a child’s homework assignment!  And that is what it was! This explained why the 
writing was so uneven – the child was still learning how to write. That is also why he or 
she did several problems having the same answer “six.” If he got another answer he 
immediately knew he had made a mistake and would go back over his work to see 
where he was wrong. All the problems had the same numerical answer, so he knew if 
came up with a different answer, he must have made an error.
AG: Your story sounds like Umberto Eco’s novel Foucault’s Pendulum: finding 
the old document and having all kinds of prejudices of what it is! 
TK: Yes, that is right! In this case, I think, it was also the matter of making all this 
study very human. We tend to look at the past only by the high points of achievements 
by its greatest intellectuals or artists. We forget that there were also children just 
learning how to add or to subtract! And given this, our study of the past becomes very 
real and very concrete. So I never forgot my lesson in the history of ancient 
mathematics!
To come back to the study system at Yale, in graduate school all I did was Western 
philosophy and, in particular, certain areas in the history of contemporary philosophy. 
We had to pass exams in three areas out of four: Metaphysics and Epistemology; Ethics, 
Politics and Philosophy of Art; Logic and Philosophy of Science; History of Western 
Philosophy. It was a written exam. We were given blank books with the exam questions 
and four hours to write our answers. Then we handed in our answers to a committee of 
the nine professors reading every exam. The student’s name was not on the 
examination sheet, so the professors did not know who wrote what. 
One interesting experience was when I went to the director of graduate studies 
afterwards to see whether I had passed or failed. He looked it over and said, “Oh yes, 
you did fine, you have passed the exams. But your examination in Epistemology and 
Metaphysics was very interesting in the way it was graded: I have never seen such a 
disparity in the grades by the professors! Some professors graded it “A-”, which is 
about the highest grade anyone ever gets, and other professors graded it “C-” which is 
about as low a grade that you can get and still pass. So you had this total range! And I 
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wonder why?” I said, “I think it was my answers…”.  For example, one of the questions 
had been: “Can a metaphysical system successfully sustain a contradiction?” I 
remember that the first sentence of my answer was “Not only can it – it must.”
AG: (laughs)
TK: So I think some professors thought my ensuing argument was convincing and 
some – not at all (laughs). 
AG: Now let us move to your major. What would be a particular area of philosophy 
you were interested in back then? What was your BA graduation thesis called and what 
did it deal with? 
TK: For my undergraduate thesis the topic came about in a rather accidental way. 
When I was a sophomore we had a visiting professor whose name was Ross Thackwell. 
He was at Yale for just for one year. He was a rather young professor and taught part of 
our History of Western Philosophy course. During that course, every so often he would 
make a reference to Buddhism along the way. Some of us students were intrigued by 
this – we did not know much about Buddhism at all, – and so we were always asking 
questions. He would give us some readings about the questions that interested us. Some 
of us were also interested in learning how to do Buddhist meditation. So he invited us to 
his house and once a week we would sit and do some Buddhist meditation. 
AG: What kind of Buddhist meditation were you practicing? Was it Zen? 
TK: No, it was a VipƗssanƗ TheravƗda kind of meditation – an awareness of 
breathing mainly.
AG: Mainly PrƗíƗyƗma?
TK: Yes, but a TheravƗdin version of it called “ƗnƗpƗna-sati” in Pali.
AG: Would you say it was the beginning of your interest in the Great Other, East 
Asia? Could one say this Englishman, Ross Thackwell, was your first key to it? 
TK: I think that is right. It came time for me to start thinking about the topic for my 
senior thesis: you submit your topic in the middle of your third year and then you write 
it in your fourth year. So, in the middle of my third year I was thinking about a topic for 
my thesis. Yale had a special program for giving a scholarship for students to go to 
Europe for the summer between their junior and senior year to work on their BA thesis. 
I had traveled very little in my life up to that point as I came from a rather poor family. 
I was only able to attend Yale because of a rather large scholarship support from the 
university. So I was thinking: if this special program is a way I can get to Europe, that 
would be wonderful! But what kind of topic could I pick that would convince the 
members of the scholarship committee that they should send me to Europe to do 
research?! I came up with the project proposal that a couple of the professors on the 
committee later said was the most bizarre proposal that anybody had ever submitted for 
this program: the project I proposed was that I wanted to go to rural Scotland to study 
Tibetan Buddhism. They thought it to be such a wild and crazy idea that certainly it 
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should get funded! My rationale was that at just about that time some Tibetan Buddhist 
monks, who had been forced into exile by the Chinese, had found their way to Scotland. 
Many of the Tibetans had gone to Switzerland, but one small group, led by a man called 
Trungpa Rimpoche, had established a small community in Scotland. Of course, years 
later Trungpa moved to America, specifically Colorado, and became fairly famous as 
the founder of the Naropa Institute and author of many books in English. But at that 
point he was relatively unknown, and I only heard about him from Ross Thackwell, my 
professor one year earlier at Yale. I had sent him some letters asking whether there was 
a way I could do something interesting with Buddhism in Europe and the Scottish 
Tibetan community was one of his suggestions. So I wrote my senior thesis on what 
happens to Buddhism when it goes from an Asian culture to a Western culture. 
AG: So your perspective was comparative from the very start? 
TK: Yes, that is right. It turned out that it was my interest right from the very start.
AG: Could one say that your focus was what happens when some major part of a 
major culture travels to an other culture and thus becomes decontextualized and 
disembedded?
TK: That is exactly right. To put it in other words, what has been behind my work 
ever since then is the issue of the relationship between thought and culture or, if you 
want, philosophy and culture. 
AG: Did it have also something to do with people mispronouncing your name and 
you being aware of your really far-away and really “strange” roots? 
TK: (laughs) Well, this was an interesting thing. Even though I lived in America 
and I only spoke English, all of my neighborhood, people around me, and my 
grandparents were Lithuanian. I had not realized at that time that there is a value system 
of some kind, a worldview that would accompany this. I thought that I was living 
according to the same worldview that all Americans had until, basically, I went to 
college and started reading into the history of Western philosophy.
I felt very comfortable with the ancient Greek philosophers and I felt comfortable 
with the medieval philosophers as well. But as soon as we started moving into the area 
of modern Western philosophy and the Enlightenment, I felt increasingly alienated – 
what I was reading was not the way that I looked at the world. Private property, the 
primacy of the individual, the idea that the state was constituted by individuals who 
contracted somehow to be a group rather than the group’s being primary – all these 
ideas were very difficult for me. I remember having to read sentences by John Locke or 
David Hume over and over again in order to try to understand: “Why are they saying 
this?” Only later, as time passed, I realized that probably in many ways I was 
encountering a worldview that was very different from my Lithuanian-American 
worldview.
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AG: The educational background acquired with the so-called “mother’s milk”? 
TK: Yes, that is right! I think it was crucial for me that I had to almost repress my 
upbringing’s worldview and push it aside in order to think like those modern Western 
philosophers. Although I was not aware of it at the time, I almost started thinking that I 
was simply stupid and this new worldview I was learning was the Truth. I was taught 
that we are born into this world as individuals and that we somehow contract to become 
groups. I was taught this as if it were the Truth – the basis of Western liberal democratic 
thinking and the basis of the American Constitution! And I accepted it that way, 
repressing in many ways my own intuitions.
This attitude changed only many years later when I first started studying Japan. 
When I first went to Japan, I felt very comfortable again – I thought that the part of me 
that I had repressed now was again foregrounded. I remember reading a line by the 20th
century Japanese philosopher Watsuji Tetsuro where he said how strange this Western 
idea of individualism was. He said something to the effect, “These Westerners think 
that they come into this world as individuals. Don’t they know they had mothers? And 
if they did not have mothers, they would not survive? We come into the world 
dependent on other people and the maturation of a human being is kind of shifting from 
this strict state of dependence into the state of interdependence.” Only then did I realize 
for the first time that what I had been taught as the Truth in a modern Western 
intellectual tradition was nothing more than one cultural view. And it was contrary to 
the Japanese worldview. What I knew about the Lithuanian view from my grandparents 
and what I knew from my readings in ancient Greek and medieval Western thought 
were just other ways of looking at the world. And those premodern Western thinkers 
were in many respects more like the Japanese in their ideas and values than were the 
modern Western European thinkers. 
This discovery became one of the fundamental points in my own thinking: I 
recognized this issue of cultural perspective to be one of the most important questions 
for a philosopher. Philosophers think they ask fundamental questions, but the most 
fundamental question is “where does my fundamental question come from?”! And then 
always we find that there is a cultural context for that question. To be really 
fundamental, philosophy must factor in the cultural context within which it is operating. 
Otherwise, it is fundamentally unreflective and does not really interrogate its basic 
premises in the way philosophy is supposed to do.
AG: How did you move from your studies in Tibetan Buddhism in Scotland to your 
further philosophical perspective which, perhaps, one could call “philosophy East and 
West”?
TK: Well, in Scotland I only spent a couple of months and did not get very deeply 
into the Tibetan Buddhist tradition. Initially, we beginners had to learn two or three 
kinds of meditation, one of which was again based on the Theravada tradition of 
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ƗnƗpƗna-sati, the awareness of breathing, which was also part of Tibetan tradition. But 
my experience in Scotland was more to address my personal interest in Buddhism. So, 
when I went back to Yale, wrote my thesis, and went on to graduate studies, I still 
primarily kept studying Western philosophy.
AG: What was it called, your thesis back in Yale? 
TK: Oh, I don’t even remember that anymore... But it could have been something 
like “Jungian Archetypes in the Use of Buddhist Discourse as It Becomes Western” or 
something… At least that was the general topic! 
AG: As a matter of fact, such experts of Japanese philosophy as James Heisig have 
also shared great interest in Carl Gustav Jung’s writings. Could you, please, specify 
more on how and why Jung was important in your early philosophy?
TK: There was a group called “Friends of the Western Buddhist Order” which I was 
familiar with when I was in Britain, and its leader was – and, in fact, still is – a teacher 
named the Venerable Sangharakshita. He was an Englishman who went to Northern 
India as a young man, as a teenager, to stay there for some twenty years studying 
various kinds of Buddhism. Then he came back to Britain and established some 
Buddhist groups, which are still going very well today. I think he was the one who had 
first mentioned Jung to me. I had a couple of rather intense experiences in meditation 
while working with him − there was something dark, some kind of strong perception of 
otherness, in the middle of this meditation − and at one point he said to me that I would 
have a trouble understanding the power of these experiences. Thus he suggested I read 
some Carl Jung, especially his discussion of the archetype of the shadow. In trying to 
understand Jung, especially his psychology of the archetypes, I tried to form a deeper 
understanding of collective unconsciousness in hopes of its explaining how Westerners 
practicing Eastern meditation could have similar experiences to those of the Asians 
even though they grew up in very different cultural worlds. How could that be? I 
wondered if Jung’s theory of archetypes was a way to try to explain that. And even 
though I do not much believe in that anymore, the Jungian model was my first model 
for trying to study comparatively the relationship between culture and experience or 
culture and thought. Reading Jung played a very important role for me in that way. That 
is why, when I went back to Yale I read every single thing that Jung had written, and 
used a great deal of Jungian ideas in my model for understanding East / West 
phenomena and the way Buddhism was coming into a Western context.
However, I have to admit that my senior thesis was absolutely terrible − no more 
than a bunch of half-thought-through ideas and struggling. But I was happy that my 
professors thought the struggle was more important than the product. They understood 
the questions I was asking were going to be important to me later, and that I had to go 
through the stage of trying to find my own way. If I had just taken some established 
idea or topic and dealt with that very pointedly, I could have written a nice thesis, but it 
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never would have had meaning to me. What I did write about has continued to drive 
some of my fundamental interests.
AG: What was your next step after you graduated from Yale? Who or what were the 
influences in your next stage, after you had left the academic structures? 
TK: To be more exact, I have to fill in one more step in my academic training. I 
completed my exams in Western philosophy so I was ready to start a dissertation after 
about two years − I went through the program very fast. I was ready to start a 
dissertation, but I did not have anything I wanted to write about! And again a response 
to circumstances led me into a new intellectual direction. One day, after discussing with 
my graduate studies director some possible topics for my doctoral dissertation, I left the 
philosophy department office and saw a poster on the wall advertising an East-West 
Philosophy conference on Wang Yang-ming. I was always deeply interested in Asia 
and somehow I felt particularly struck by the fact that there was going to be this 
conference at the East–West Center, University of Hawaii. I was reading an 
announcement for a conference on an Asian philosopher (Wang Yang-ming) who was 
so important that people from all over the world were gathering in Hawaii for a 
conference. Yet, despite my previous interest in Asian philosophy, I had no idea who 
Wang Yang-ming was! So, I wondered, maybe it was time for me to start studying 
Asian philosophy seriously. I went to my adviser John Smith and he was extremely 
encouraging. He helped me receive a fellowship from the East–West Center so I could 
spend one year and a half studying Asian philosophy both in Honolulu at the University 
of Hawaii, and also in Japan.
My reason for studying Japan was rather interesting. I knew I wanted to study Asian 
philosophy, but the East–West Center said I had to choose a particular area of focus − 
India, China, Japan or Korea. They wanted to be sure that I received proper language 
training − without language training one could not go very far in any field of Asian 
studies. Obviously, I would not have time to study all the Asian languages. I had 
studied some Indian philosophy in English because of my interests in Buddhism. I 
found that, basically, Indian philosophy is very understandable: if you change a few 
premises, Indian reasoning becomes not all that different from Western reasoning. So, I 
thought to myself, India was not the best tradition to study if I want something really 
different. China was a little bit more intriguing. Its social philosophy and strong ethical 
emphasis attracted me but, very importantly for those times, communist China was 
closed to Americans. So, going there was out of the question. Of course, there were 
studies in Hong Kong and Taiwan, but this seemed to be more diaspora Chinese or 
exile Chinese to me rather than real Chinese. In contrast to China, Japan was 
completely open. Furthermore, everything that I have read about Japanese philosophy 
in English − the things by D. T. Suzuki, for example, − did not make any sense 
whatsoever. So if I wanted to study something different, that seemed to be the best 
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thing to study: either I would study that for a while and then come back and say: “Well, 
the Japanese, whatever they are doing is so different… I do not know what to call what 
they are doing, but it is not philosophy. It makes no sense; there is no reasoning behind 
it; they are anti-rational” (which would sound like D. T. Suzuki). Or, alternatively, I 
might come back from Japan saying: “We Westerners are studying Japanese thought all 
wrong! There are all kinds of philosophy in Japan! We simply did not have a proper 
access to it in the West − we are looking at this tradition in a wrong way.” Either 
alternative reaction would be an interesting conclusion. So I decided to focus on Japan. 
Unlike almost all my American friends who were in the field of Japanese studies 
and who were fascinated by some aspect of Japanese culture − samurai, geisha, haiku
poetry or Japanese woodblock prints − I had no interest at all in anything Japanese. So I 
did not approach Japan with any particular love for Japan. I suspect that when I started 
studying Japanese philosophy and finally went to Japan, the way I related to “things 
Japanese” had something to do with my pre-college training and acculturation as 
Lithuanian American. I would see things in Japanese culture that would remind me of 
my grandparents who were Lithuanian, not Japanese. There was more of Lithuania that 
was like Japan than the modern Western, post-Enlightenment worldview was like 
Japan. So I found a way by which I could relate to Japan very directly because of my 
ethnic background. I was able to understand many things very quickly and intuitively. 
The Japanese language was very strange and it was still very awkward for me at the 
time, but the way in which people related to each other and the assumptions they 
brought to their thinking were often quite familiar to me. So, I did not have much 
trouble in acculturating into the Japanese context.
And so partly because of that, and working out those differences, I realized it was 
part of my destiny to make Japanese thought more intelligible to the West. I remember 
when I was writing my first book Zen Action / Zen Person in 1980 and I sent one copy 
of the manuscript to a Japanese philosopher who read English very well: Yuasa Yasuo. 
And I sent a second copy to an American philosopher who had no access to Japanese 
sources but knew all the writings on Zen in Western languages and had himself written 
some things on Zen − Paul Wienpaul. Paul Wienpaul wrote back to me that it was 
unlike anything else he had ever read on Zen Buddhism. The Japanese scholar said that 
he found it all very good, but was surprised by how traditionally Japanese the book is! 
So at that point I knew my manuscript was ready to be published: I was not saying 
anything that was radical from a Japanese point of view but yet the West had never 
heard it before.
AG: After you had published your book so successfully, did it encourage you to 
move further? And in what way did it mean to you “to move further” − was it, for 
example, gaining deeper knowledge in the Japanese language or meeting some other 
people that would influence you? 
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TK: After I finished my dissertation, parts of which related to the book “Zen Action / 
Zen Person”, I had a couple of alternatives: I could go into Japanese studies more 
deeply (my Japanese language was still very weak at that time) or I could return to the 
Western philosophical studies and use Japanese philosophy as an interesting 
comparative example. The most important factor in the final decision was that I was 
offered the job at the University of Hawaii to teach courses in Japanese philosophy. It 
was 1975, and there were not too many job possibilities in America at that time. So, I 
felt the decision was being made for me and I should go more deeply into Japanese 
studies.
As I studied Japanese things more thoroughly, I started realizing that one could 
understand Japanese culture quite well if one had the right sensitivity on the superficial 
level. But the more deeply one penetrated the culture, the more complicated and 
different it became. I also started seeing how most Western scholarship seemed to be 
aimed at making Japanese culture look as complicated as possible and that, in fact, so 
many books written by Japan specialists were intended to be read only by other Japan 
specialists. I started moving in that scholarly direction, because I needed the expertise, 
but I did not want to become a Japan specialist of that kind − I always wanted to have a 
comparative standpoint. It was a rather difficult time for me to find exactly what I 
wanted to do and I turned to writing articles rather than books on a sort of 
point-by-point basis. That way I could write articles that were a little technical and 
meant for other Japan scholars.
For example, I wrote a couple of articles on Dǀgen that were on quite specific points 
such as Dǀgen’s own hermeneutics (the essay was called “Dǀgen on how to read 
Shǀbǀgenzǀ”). The essay showed that in his writings he gives the reader guidelines on 
how to read a Zen text like his. No one in Japan had ever thought of approaching Dǀgen
that way and no one in the West had thought of studying the text that way, so I tried to 
be careful in showing that my interpretation was based on Dǀgen’s own writings and 
not on something that I made up. It would not be as strange to read the essay now when 
we are used to evaluating things in a more postmodern perspective but back in the late 
1970s, some of my points seemed quite startling to some readers. At this point I was 
already leaving Hawaii and moving to a small college in Northern Wisconsin. 
AG: How long did you teach at the University of Hawaii?
TK: I stayed there from 1976 till 1981, with the exception of one year when I was at 
Harvard as a visiting professor in the Department of East Asian Languages and 
Civilizations and in the Divinity School’s Center for the Study of World Religions, a 
center with a history going back to the 1950s, by the way.
AG: I apologize for a short digression: when was the East–West Center in Honolulu 
established?
TK: It was under Lyndon Johnson − the middle of the 1960s.
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AG: Could you say the goals of the East–West Center somehow coincided with 
your own goals? Why would one need to establish such a Center?
TK: When you think about the mid-sixties, the Cold War era, it was becoming 
clearer that after the experience of the war in Korea and then America’s getting very 
deeply involved in Vietnam that the way America related world was not just going in 
the direction of Europe and the Soviet Union, but also going in the direction of Japan, 
China, Korea, India. The US had two shores facing two opposite directions of the 
Eurasian continent and our interactions with Asia would be just as important as our 
interactions with Europe. This was the crucial point − the emergence of a global 
economy and geopolitics. It would be very foolish to think that the world’s economy 
today is somehow centered only in the West. It is interesting that the East–West 
Center’s full name was something like “Center for the Technical and Cultural 
Exchange Between East and West”. So the idea was that we needed to exchange 
technology, but also that this had to be based on understanding culture. The cultural 
difference was the basis for the human relations while the technological and economic 
exchange would follow from that. 
AG: So it was not at all a merely academic interest but very practical politi- 
cal-economical interests behind it? 
TK: Oh, absolutely! I would say right from the start: two thirds of the Center’s 
activities were more practice-oriented. I remember when I got there in 1972 I saw a list 
of various on-going projects and there were topics like “Peanut Farming in South-East 
Asia” or “Population Growth and Its Effects on the Economies of the Pacific 
Countries”, or “The Distribution of Radio and Television Stations in Southeast Asia”, 
and so forth. That would be two-thirds of the activities, and only one third would be 
related to the humanities, arts, or culture in general.
AG: Given this “statistics”, were you not tempted to turn into some more 
“practical” direction? How, do you think, philosophy’s general attitude can be 
meaningfully situated in such pragmatic affairs? 
TK: Philosophy aspires to get to the foundations of the premises on which we build 
on our worldviews. I realized that most Western philosophy today does not do that 
because it is actually culturally blind to what is and is not Western. Most Western 
philosophers today do not realize that they have made assumptions that in fact are 
culturally based assumptions. This realization has led me to the conclusion just how 
important it is now to do philosophy on a comparative basis. If you think that you are 
born into this world as an individual and some others think that they are born into the 
world already as a group because they had mothers, − this can deeply and profoundly 
change your understanding of human nature. All your premises will then be different. 
And also the way you do business or politics will be different! And this is why in my 
book Intimacy or Integrity, I have tried to show that even very small differences in 
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assumptions at the basis of a cultural way of thinking have profound effects on how you 
would do philosophy, how you would answer the questions like “How do I know what 
I know?”, “What is the best way to persuade a person rationally?”, “What are the norms 
of ethics or politics that I should follow?”, “What are the standards or norms in art?” 
The answers to these questions we formulate differently, depending on very simple and 
fundamental premises we make from our cultural standpoint. And unless you do 
comparative philosophy, you will remain blind to all this because everybody around 
you will have the same assumptions and you will think these are the only assumptions. 
When you study another culture you start realizing that in fact these assumptions were 
learnt as part of your acculturation while growing up. 
AG: It is often maintained that the predominant ancient model of interaction 
between different civilizations or essentially different cultures was, however sad it is 
say, war. And now this model is totally transformed: we have diplomatic interactions, 
we are studying each other. So my rather provocative question would be: do you or do 
you not think that it is actually Western culture that is studying other cultures more than 
it is other cultures studying Western culture to try to enter into diplomatic relations, to 
understand the Other in the way West does? Or would it be hypocritical to maintain so? 
TK: There are two points here. One is that the Western European and American 
worldviews have established their presence all around the world because of the 
hegemony of the powerful economic and military system behind it. So, in a way, 
everybody around the world knows something about America − they cannot help it, 
they have no choice. The American mentality is very interesting, because America is 
primarily made up of people who came from all over the world and immigrated to 
America and then formed a new culture based on certain general principles. Most 
European countries, for example, arose out of ethnic connections, linguistic 
connections, religious connections, or a common cultural history. I think Americans 
often assume that the whole world will become like America. To the rest of the world 
this seems like the most extreme arrogance: the very idea that the whole world wants to 
become like America! But from an American historical standpoint the crucial point is 
this: the whole world came to America and became America! So it is very easy to make 
the assumption that the rest of the world in a global economy will become more like 
America. America already set the model for how to merge radically different cultural 
strains into a single system. So this is certainly one reason most Americans study the 
world very superficially. Their expectation is: “If we can just help the other countries 
get started, they will eventually undertake a sequence of thinking about things or doing 
things in a certain way. Then ultimately they will become more and more like America”. 
Not because America has something special that it uniquely has because of its ethnic 
history, or its religious history or its blood or its superior genetics, but rather because 
America was made by people coming from all over the world, coming together and 
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saying, “How can we all live together?” So America was the test-case for globalization. 
This is something that, I think, the rest of the world does not understand about the 
American psyche. They think that we are imposing American culture and, in fact, when 
I look at the global situation as an outsider that certainly seems to be the way things are. 
But to a great extent it is also true that the world wants to be a part of a globalized world 
and, if they do, America has been a test-case of how to do that. The problem is that 
Americans are very naïve about all this and confuse their Americanism with the more 
abstract principles of global cooperation.
AG: Thinking “Everybody loves us because we have representatives of all the 
countries in America”? 
TK: Yes, but what Americans typically do not realize is that those “representatives” 
in America are actually people who wanted to leave their country and come to 
America! There were, of course, also those who disliked America and went back home 
− like, for instance, one of my great uncles. But Americans don’t typically focus on 
those who did not like the New World and went back home. Still, the American Dream 
was a real dream for many people. My own grandparents thought it wonderful that 
people could move through different classes, that they could own their own land, that 
no one was better than anyone else because of birth, that it was possible for their 
children and grandchildren to get educated and achieve so much. So many Americans 
think other people would also like it to be that way and they do not realize how 
important for many people ethnic identity is. For example, the war in former 
Yugoslavia is really puzzling to Americans! Or the religious wars between Catholics 
and Protestants or Sunni and Shiites. Americans feel like “Yes, generations ago we too 
had these old hostilities in our American neighborhood and then they virtually 
disappeared as people blended into the ‘American melting-pot’”. All the ethnic and 
religious differences got somehow included in the larger belief system, the system of 
American universal principles. There continue to be, of course, problems like racism in 
America, but it is amazing to see what a big advance has been made in the last fifty 
years. Racism is at least no longer as institutionalized in the blatant ways it used to be 
(segregation in schools, separate drinking and eating places for black and whites, and 
so forth). So, although I would never say racism has disappeared, at least we have made 
some notable progress. 
AG: Now let us return to the “safer side” − to the realm of academic knowledge. 
Could you specify more on the life in the East–West Center and on what effects the 
University of Hawaii period had on your work, in what way you were influenced by the 
University or had an influence on the University?
TK: The University of Hawaii Philosophy Department started doing something 
called “East–West Philosophy” back in the 1930s. Then it was under the direction of a 
man named Charles A. Moore. He worked very hard to make the early East–West 
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philosophy conferences possible, for example. The first conference was organized in 
the 1930s and all the participants from all over the world had to come to the conference 
by boat. Many of them had to travel for two or three weeks to reach Hawaii! So, for the 
sake of convenience, the conferences were five weeks long. Participants would stay 
together for five weeks in Honolulu, eat meals together, share their opinions − that was 
a real exchange!
AG: It also sounds very medieval! 
TK: This is how it started, and the journal “Philosophy East and West” was 
launched shortly after World War II. However, a major development began when Eliot 
Deutsch came to Honolulu in the late 1950s. Then a real curricular development 
started: if you came to University of Hawaii to study philosophy, you studied Western 
philosophy, Asian philosophy and then comparative philosophy. All three would be 
interrelated. By the time I was a student there in 1972, half of the faculty of the 
Philosophy Department specialized in Asian philosophy, the other half in Western 
philosophy. Comparative philosophy was happening everywhere, in all the subfields of 
philosophy. When I was hired by Hawaii, I actually was coming back to Hawaii where 
I had been in the graduate school for eighteen months, getting my second MA degree. 
When my mentor Robert J. J. Wargo left Hawaii, they needed someone else to come in 
and so they invited me, his former student.
What I did in the curriculum when I came to Hawaii was to change the 
understanding of the history of Japanese philosophy. Although Wargo always said that 
philosophy in Japan goes back to ancient times, he only focused on the post-Meiji, the 
20th century developments. Though he always made references to some ancient 
Japanese thinkers like Dǀgen, Kǌkai, Shinran, etc., he had really never taught them. I 
proposed we made them part of the curriculum and later developed a three-course 
sequence in Japanese philosophy that started with Ancient and Medieval Japanese 
Philosophy, then Medieval and Tokugawa Philosophy, and, finally, Modern Japanese 
Philosophy. And it was first time in America (and, to my knowledge, in Europe as well) 
that the history of Japanese Philosophy was conceived as a historical progression from 
the 7th or the 8th century up to the present. Even in Japan this is not the way they do it 
because of the division of specialties: if you study Nihonshisǀshi (“the history of 
Japanese thought”), it tends to start with the Tokugawa period, around 1600. For 
philosophy before that one would have to study bukkyǀshisǀshi (history of Buddhist 
ideas). Shinto has a funny kind of place – Japanese scholars generally do not treat 
ancient Shinto ideas as philosophy until they get up to kokugaku (“native studies”) 
thought in the eighteenth century. For Shinto ideas before then, one has to study 
minzokugaku – ethnic studies, folklore, and so forth. Also, the ideas behind the 
Japanese arts are not studied as “philosophy” in Japan but in separate departments of 
Japanese art and aesthetics. Even more strangely, ethics – whether Japanese or Western 
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– is taught in its own departments. So, everything we might call “Japanese philosophy” 
is divided into separate fields. Hawaii was the first place to unite all these various fields 
of Japanese philosophical tradition into a single curriculum that stretched from the 
study of ancient times up to the present. 
As I mentioned before, after Hawaii I moved to a small college in a rural area of 
northern Wisconsin, a beautiful part of the country but very cold and isolated. One of 
the reasons for this change was my wish to be less specialized than I was in Hawaii, to 
allow myself to think of things in a more interdisciplinary way. In Hawaii I could only 
teach Japanese philosophy, as there were many other specialists in all other fields of 
Japanese studies (over seventy faculty members spread throughout the University!). In 
contrast, in a small college I could teach anything about Japan that I wanted. This 
allowed me to expand some of my interests. For example, I could teach a course in 
Japanese film, or course in Japanese cultural history, a course in Japanese aesthetic 
theories, etc. 
Now let me return to your question about what kinds of articles I wrote in 
Wisconsin going back to my article “Dǀgen on How to Read Shǀbǀgenzǀ” in particular. 
These were the times before the post-modern ideas of interpretation had become 
popular, and I was reading it strictly from the standpoint of what Dǀgen himself had 
said about language and interpretation. When the article was published, a couple of 
colleagues called me and asked if I was feeling all right; or, perhaps I was losing 
contact with academia living so far in the North? Why I was writing such odd pieces? 
However, if we read this article today it may seem as a rather straightforward piece on 
the modern use of hermeneutics for reading text. Also during that same period in 
Wisconsin I also wrote an article on “Nirvana” for the “Encyclopedia of Religion,” 
edited by Mircea Eliade. Writing that article was quite challenging and I enjoyed 
writing it quite a bit. It forced me to think about various kinds of connections among 
different schools of Buddhism that went far outside what I had been teaching in 
Japanese philosophy at the University of Hawaii, but fit quite well my broader-based 
courses I was teaching at a small college in Wisconsin. Many people told me they 
found this article very useful.
While teaching at Northland College in Wisconsin, I also gradually moved into the 
field of comparative religion. Because our small department covered both religion and 
philosophy, I did not have to worry about which it was I was teaching at any given time.  
Because in many works I tried to examine the relationship between practice and 
religious doctrine, I found very quickly that my writings were understood and 
appreciated by certain people in the field of religious studies, often more than in 
philosophy (which was still so Eurocentric in its focus). The problem of bodily 
involvement in religion was important to me: philosophy tended to ignore the 
importance of body and to emphasize philosophy as just intellectual ideas. In that 
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period I also worked on the translation of Yuasa Yasuo’s book The Body: Towards the 
Eastern Body-Mind Theory with Shigenori Nagatomo. That also created some interest 
among American scholars as a new kind of topic to explore from a philosophical 
standpoint, but within the context of comparative religion. I also did some editing work. 
I edited anthologies of essays written by various people resulting in a three-volume set 
of books edited together with Roger T. Ames, a sinologist, and Wimal Dissanayake, an 
indologist: Self as Body in Asian Theory and Practice, Self as Person in Asian Theory 
and Practice, and Self as Image in Asian Theory and Practice. I was very much 
interested in bringing together various kinds of scholars from the variety of places and 
disciplines to comment on the topics like that. All that kept me busy with my new 
research without at that point having to write a new book of my own. 
AG: Now let us turn to your book Intimacy and Integrity. Could one say it is the 
work that reveals best what you wanted to do in theory? It is a book on philosophy: both 
a very general and at the same time a very exhaustive model of how things come to be 
organized in different cultures. It bears on many Japanese examples, but it is a 
philosophy book, which can be used in Introduction to Philosophy classes, or 
Aesthetics classes. Could you tell more about this book of yours and how it harmonizes 
with your general concept of what a theoretician could and should do in the present 
day?
TK: For decades I have been using the concept of “intimacy” on and off when 
talking about Japanese culture. I also published an article in the Philosophy East and 
West journal called “Intimacy: A General Orientation in Japanese Religious Values.” 
So, I had had this idea about “intimacy” for some time and I had been using it in 
lectures and course work. And then I received a phone call from Trent University in 
Canada which hosts the Gilbert Ryle lecture series. They asked me whether I would be 
interested in giving a series of lectures, which would be in philosophy but also be in 
some sense comparative, bringing in some Asian aspects. It was at that point that I 
realized it was the time to pull together my ideas on “intimacy” more tightly and 
develop a more coherent and comprehensive theory of what I was doing when I was 
talking about “intimacy” in relation to Japan. In my lectures people were often asking: 
“If Japan is a culture that emphasizes and foregrounds intimacy, what is the 
background and the foreground of the modern Western philosophical tradition?” It was 
quite a while before I finally came up with the idea of “integrity” as the opposite. So by 
this point I was ready to talk about “intimacy” and “integrity” as two different models 
of cultural orientation that would then set up basic paradigms for philosophical 
thinking. These orientations would affect not just particular philosophical ideas – 
which many people had done before – but, in fact, would affect the whole way in which 
philosophy is done systematically whether the field is epistemology, or metaphysics, or 
persuasive argument, or logical analysis, or aesthetics, or politics, or ethics. 
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Philosophizing then would be seen as a cultural activity: within a certain cultural 
orientation one would tend to philosophize in a certain way regardless of which of 
those discrete subfields of philosophy one is in. So, in a way, it was an attempt to set the 
theoretical basis for understanding culture and philosophy in their most abstract and 
therefore generalizable form. I use in my book many examples from Japan, but there 
are also many examples from other cultures and subcultures, too. I did this because I am 
sure no culture is totally a culture of intimacy or a culture of integrity, but rather it is 
always more a mixture, wherein one tends to be the more default position and the other 
aspect would be in exceptions. I did try to draw on various different cultural 
phenomena in developing the book, so it was not just the book about Japan versus
Western thinking. In that way I also hoped to avoid the problem of essentializing 
Japanese thinking and Western thinking as if they were “totally Other” for each other.
AG: What would be your major Western examples of “intimacy” comparable with 
the Japanese ones? You may be well aware of attempts to compare Meister Eckhart 
with Zen or, as Jung does, to draw parallels between Ignatius Loyolas’ “Exertitia 
Spiritualia” and Asian meditation. We also have certain trends of Greek thought, 
especially in pre-Socratic philosophy, that seem to be comparable to the East Asian 
thinking. How would you specify on that? 
TK: My general impression is that early Greek thought probably emphasized the 
idea of “intimacy” as foreground, but Aristotle had started the line of argument that 
later led to the dominance of the model of “integrity” (at least, I think Aristotle more 
than Plato). I wrote an article many years ago, dealing with the idea of what constitutes 
distinctively philosophical language, what would be the rules of talking philosophically. 
In the article I saw some similarities in ancient Greek culture and ancient Japanese 
culture. When Kǌkai developed a first coherent philosophical theory in Japan, he very 
clearly favored the “intimacy” point of view. The turning point in the West was certain 
ideas that Plato expressed in his “Cratylus”. And even though Plato in his dialogue and 
even throughout his life was a little more leaning towards the “intimacy” side than the 
“integrity” side, the seeds were already there, and Aristotle moved to the “integrity” 
side in developing the rules of logical reasoning. However, what happens with the 
influx of Christian ideas, with the influence of Jerusalem on Athens as it were, is that 
there was some kind of reopening of the psychological sense of religion by its emphasis 
on Jesus’s referring to God as love. This was quite different from Aristotle’s abstract 
God as final cause. This new psychological dimension was introduced into Western 
thought via Christianity. So, even though the Aristotelian view was predominant to 
start with, the Neoplatonic tradition began to gain influence. So, I think much of the 
Medieval Western thought had more to do more with “intimacy” than with “integrity”. 
Then, again, in late medieval times the rediscovery of Aristotle through the Arabs gave 
birth to Scholasticism. There began a slow movement towards the “integrity model” 
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which then blossomed fully with the birth of modern Western thought, Cartesianism, 
and so forth. This integrity emphasis became concretized and institutionalized as the 
dominant mode of Western philosophy by the time of the Enlightenment. Throughout 
the modern period, though, we can find exceptions: in epistemology we have Michael 
Polanyi arguing for expert knowledge and tacit knowledge – something more like the 
“intimacy” point of view. He says this type of knowing exists in the practice of science. 
So, even in science, intimacy plays a role, a role that he wanted to emphasize. In 
aesthetics, it is really quite common to find intimacy modes discussed in relation to 
various kinds of things. In ethics, with situational ethics and its emphasis on agape,
Joseph Fletcher’s attempted to make ethics something more intimately based. And, of 
course, as you mentioned, in religious thought, the mystical tradition of people like 
Meister Eckhart fits the intimacy model as well.
AG: How about the “intimacy” tendencies in the contemporary thought? 
TK: In the development of newer movements, several elements of post-modernism 
and of feminist epistemologies tend to be more intimacy than integrity oriented. All of 
this goes to show that no culture is monolithic or hegemonic, but there are always 
currents, sub-currents, and countercurrents existing all together at the same time. And 
now, with certain moves of postmodernism and post-colonial thinking, there are the 
attempts to recapture some intimacy-based concepts. The post-colonial endeavor is 
based on the interpretation and often goes something like this: “We used to be an 
‘intimacy-based’ culture; we were then colonized and forced to adopt the ‘integrity 
model’. Now in our post-colonial phase we can go back to restore some of what we 
lost.” Therefore, some aspects of Western thinking that were once completely 
dominated by integrity orientations are now slowing shifting closer to some modes of 
intimacy-based thinking. It is quite possible that this tendency will become even 
stronger during the next 50 years.
AG: Some rather well acclaimed theories in social psychology tend to assert that, at  
least in the West, the intimacy-based, cooperative and mutually supportive model of 
thinking and behavior is more characteristic of women and the integrity-based model of 
rivalry and warship and aggression – of men. What would be your opinion about such a 
rather sharp division? Would it hold true interculturally? 
TK: I think there is quite a bit of truth in such a division. But this reflects mainly on 
how traditional Western thought developed. The West developed gender roles in a 
certain way and then tried to read those roles back as universal signs of a gender 
difference in human nature. How could this difference come about evolutionally, they 
wondered? One way of addressing the problem was to argue that originally there were 
hunting and gathering cultures. The men were hunters, whereas women had to work 
cooperatively, agriculturally, and communally in raising children. This explanation 
was used to justify the historical “truth” of the traditional Western gender distinction. 
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Yet, I have argued that in Japan, by contrast, males have traditionally been more 
intimacy-oriented and females more integrity-oriented. That may seem like a strange 
thing, but when you think about it it is not so strange. In Japan, the men are taught that 
they have to be cooperative: that they have to cooperate with their fellow workers and 
that they have to spend a lot of time with their fellow workers developing human 
relations as the basis of business and political relations. Thus they learn to identify with 
the group, learning to be reflective of the whole in a kind of holographic way. So, the 
company they work for becomes an intrinsic part of their own identity. Their business 
cards delay what their identity is: it shows the corporation or the organization to which 
they belong and their specific role within that organization. Studies have shown that 
Westerners identify themselves in quite an opposite way: the role of the individual first, 
organization second. So, if I ask a Japanese what he does for a living, he says 
something like “I work for Sony.” Then, I ask what he does at Sony and he says, “I’m 
an engineer.” Studies show, however, that the answers are reversed in America. People 
say first, “I am an engineer” and then only if asked, they add “I work for General 
Electric.” As for family structure and child-rearing, I have argued that aspects of both 
intimacy and of integrity are needed in a society, so in the Japanese family the boys 
more strongly gravitate toward the intimacy side and the girls are brought up to be more 
independent. Women in traditional Japan are the ones who have to leave their house 
and to join their husband’s house when they marry. That means they have to transport 
their identity across different intimacy groups. It requires a strong sense of integrity to 
be able to do that. If her identity is attached to her own family, when she has to leave 
that family and join another family she is at a complete loss – the woman would have 
lost all of her identity. But if she has some core of integrity that is context-independent, 
she can take that with her from one family to the next. Secondly, women do not have 
business cards and Western feminists are quick to say, “See, women are unimportant, 
they do not have an identity!”; but if the identity of women is tied not so closely, in a 
holographic way, to the organization to which they belong, then the business card is 
irrelevant. So, as we can see, when examined cross-culturally the gender constructions 
are very complicated, and gender divisions in one culture do not have to necessarily 
correspond to those of the other.
AG: Let us now return to the role of philosophy which is said now to become a 
“servant” or “assistant” to Western science, that philosophia perennis has turned into 
scientific methodology. It has definitely stopped playing the role in Western society it 
used to play. In your article “Sushi, Science and Spirituality: The Views of Science in 
Modern Japanese Philosophy” you give an exciting example how a careful, attentive 
look at the nature – intimacy, if you want, worked better in developing the mechanism 
of VCR at the Japanese VCR producing company than did mathematical calculations 
and theoretical methodological strategies. Could you, please, comment on the 
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differences in the role of theoretical reasoning and practical attitude both in 
contemporary Western and in East Asian context? 
TK: I think philosophy in the West has kind of lost its way. It used to be trying to 
get at the basic assumptions and methods needed for understanding life and living in 
the world, living with other fellow beings, living with nature, etc. Then the individual 
sciences could develop the practical details and applications. What happened was the 
development of, particularly, logical positivism in the West. It started in Great Britain 
(and Vienna), spread into the United States and then took over much of the Western 
world. In it we have the idea that somehow philosophy should be a scientific enterprise 
rather than a philosophical enterprise in the old sense, that philosophy is a kind of 
scientific thinking rather than science is a kind of philosophical thinking. (That 
scientists receive a PhD, a “doctor of philosophy,” is a remnant of the old viewpoint.) 
This reversal, to my mind, was really fundamental to what happened to philosophy in 
the academy. This position was already expressed very well in Ludwig Wittgenstein’s 
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus when he gave a very narrow definition of words such 
that they should correspond in a one-to-one relationship with things or events. Then 
logic would perfectly model the way that the reality was put together. And that would 
be it – everything else that we speak of that does not fit that model. As he says in the last 
line of his Tractatus, “we must forever pass over it in silence.” That phrase – that 
philosophy only is what we can talk about scientifically and everything else we should 
remain silent about – became a rallying flag of logical positivism. Even though 
Wittgenstein himself in his later writings explicitly rejected that view, it had an 
enormous impact on philosophy, particularly in the English-speaking world, but to 
some extent also on Continental philosophy as well. What has happened then, is that 
philosophy has become, in my model, mono-orientational. This is to say that 
philosophy only can see relations in one way. It limits itself to only one way of talking 
about reality. And in so doing it becomes only a kind of scientific thinking. Yet, the 
possibility of using the other orientation, even in technological and engineering context 
– the context that I am talking about in my article you have mentioned that includes the 
example of the invention of the home video tape recorder – this shows that things can 
be related in other ways. And, as a matter of fact, this has been a long tradition in 
Western philosophy!
It has also been the dominant tradition in most of the history of Japanese philosophy. 
In the modern Japanese context, what they have done with the idea of technology is in 
some ways to incorporate both: the more traditional intimacy foregrounded way 
alongside the Western scientific, analytic, more integrity-based model. Interestingly, 
and going back to our former topic, this was the way it used to be in America, at least 
until the 1940s. That is, Americans were successful in what they called “Yankee 
ingenuity”: the ability to look at specific cases – not to develop new scientific theories 
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but to find new ways of applying scientific theories to practical things. Therefore, we 
found that so much of the great American inventiveness was done by people without 
scientific degrees: the Wright brothers invented the airplane and they were not 
aeronautical engineers but bicycle-makers; Thomas Edison had very little formal 
scientific training and he invented the light bulb; the phonograph-recorder, the 
film-projector – all of these things were invented by people who were not thinking 
through some scientific-theoretical model first but rather used the application and 
“tinkering model”, as we called it, within their engineering process. And this was 
dominant in American science until the period of the late 1930s and into the 1940s and 
beyond. At that time America had experienced a wave of immigration by highly 
educated, very sophisticated, scientifically-oriented individuals. Many of them were 
Jewish refugees escaping Nazism – Einstein, for example, – who came to the United 
States so that they could pursue their science freely; they introduced the most 
theoretical aspects of science to America. And suddenly in American universities we 
taught a very theoretical model of science based on highly sophisticated mathematical 
reasoning. Gradually, from that period on, more and more Nobel prizes were won by 
Americans and no longer only Europeans, because the Americans had picked up this 
form of reasoning and developed it in their universities. This age of the cutting-edge 
science came to be called an emphasis on “basic science” (as opposed to “applied 
science”). Whether this science had immediate commercial application or any practical 
application was irrelevant. Increasingly, as American science dominated the more 
theoretical side, the practical application was left to be developed in places like Japan. 
“Yankee ingenuity” was switching to Japan! Americans were developing the 
theoretical models and the Japanese were finding the ways of turning these models into 
engineering projects. This scientific phenomenon led to the rise of the emergence of 
Japan as the center for high-tech engineering in manufacturing new pro- 
ducts – electronic, automotive, optical, and so forth. However, fairly recently, in the 
last fifteen years or so, the Japanese have decided that they want to win Nobel prizes 
too. So, they have imported European and American scientists to train their young 
scientists how to do basic scientific research. The Japanese have, in fact, started 
winning more Nobel prizes as they focus more on the theoretical side that is not directly 
aimed at engineering and developing new products.
AG: Let us linger more on this topic of the practical side of knowledge, but this time 
in the Lithuanian cultural context. As you are already aware, there is a Center of Asian 
Studies at Vilnius University. Notwithstanding the fact that the community of Asian 
inhabitants in Lithuania is still very small, what practical perspective would you see in 
the activities of our Center, even though it is almost entirely humanities-oriented? 
TK: I think it already has more practical importance than might be evident to many 
Lithuanian intellectuals. This importance derives from what will happen in the 
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economic and technological developments of the 21st century. There will be a massive 
and complex collaboration among the major world centers of engineering and scientific 
thinking. These centers obviously are not located only in America and Europe, but also 
in Japan and, increasingly, in India and China. You will find that major breakthroughs 
in science and technology will be in joint global enterprises that will be coordinated 
across Asian and Western lines. It is predicted that in ten years from now, there will be 
more websites in Chinese than in European languages. What are you going to tell your 
students: “Sorry, you cannot read these languages because we are only concentrating 
on the West”? They would inevitably be behind, as Western students in other countries 
are already learning those languages! Thus I think it is very important and valuable that 
in Vilnius University you have the Asian Studies Center for learning those languages. 
This will without any doubt help you not only to become more educated, but also to 
foster Lithuanian economical and technological development as a part of the European 
Union as well as a member of the global economy. 
AG: Now let me turn to a completely other side of knowledge – to the so-called 
“unnecessary” sciences, the Humanities. It seems to be an increasing tendency to 
diminish resources, to diminish funding for humanities and arts; how can they justify 
themselves at the beginning of the 21st century, which tends to be more and more 
pragmatic?
TK: We could use two ways – the integrity-oriented methodology and the 
intimacy-oriented methodology – to argue why the humanities have to remain 
important. According to the integrity point of view, it is often maintained that science 
and technology are value-neutral. This standpoint has sometimes been interpreted to 
mean “scientists can do whatever they want, because they are not value-dependent”. 
This, of course, is ridiculous. Consider this analogy. Another phenomenon that 
supposedly has nothing to do with values is language: languages are neither full of 
value nor lack value. But what makes language moral or immoral, constructive or 
destructive for humanity, is what we say in the language. So, to apply the analogy, if we 
start thinking of science and technology not as something like a value-neutral language, 
but instead think of science in terms of what scientists say and doe, there always should 
remain such questions in science as “Should we?” or “Ought we?” And these questions 
should be answered in terms of what human beings have been to each other, have done 
to each other, and what they are and can be. The answers, therefore, are interwoven 
with the traditions of the humanities and arts. Even though the questions have to be 
answered on behalf of issues arising from science, science itself can never decide what 
it should do anymore than the grammar of a language can guarantee moral speech. In 
the end, the scientists must look for direction outside their own discipline.
AG: If I am correct, the well-known philosopher of science Stephen Toulmin has 
once said that after Oppenheimer there can be no such thing as the value-neutral 
science. Would this be close to your point of view? 
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TK: Toulmin is exactly correct. The idea that science can do whatever it wants 
because it is value-free is ridiculous. Why? Because what it does affects the entire 
world. So if the scientist refuses to answer the question of what should be done, the 
agenda for future directions in scientific and technological development should be set 
by humanists who are interested in the questions such as “What should be or ought to 
be?” and not only “What can we do technically?” So, even from the integrity standpoint, 
we have arrived at the conclusion that the directions for science should be influenced 
by people with a humanistic orientation. 
By contrast, the intimacy standpoint assumes from the very start that there is no 
such thing in the world as the value-free knowing. Knowing always involves some kind 
of interaction with the thing that you know. Therefore, there is some kind of 
responsibility and morality that is built into the very act of knowledge. Thus, from the 
intimacy standpoint, the idea of value-free science is in fact an oxymoron, a 
contradiction: you can not know without entering into the thing that you are knowing or 
to the other person that you are knowing. There is an empathic form of knowing that is 
behind even the most fundamental or basic knowledge: as Heisenberg showed, even in 
knowing about the nature of the electron, the observer cannot be separated from the 
observed. If you want to view it into this more intimacy-based model – the model that 
Michael Polanyi talks about when he uses the term tacit knowledge, – from that 
standpoint humanities and science cannot be separated in the first place. It is not the 
matter of one overriding the other or one being separate from the other, but rather the 
obvious fact is that they cannot be separated. So, from either standpoint – that of either 
integrity or intimacy – science cannot be left as something that is value-free. In no way 
can it ignore the more humanistic values.
AG: One could imagine someone from the Anglo-Saxon analytical philosophy 
“camp” saying that claiming that the “intimacy model” should take more and more over 
knowledge amounts to claiming a more aesthetic and more romantic worldview. It was 
Nietzsche who pointed out the damaging impact of “Socratic rationalism” on Greek 
tragedy and the aesthetical worldview of ancient Greeks, on the healing power of the 
Myth or, if we translate it into your own terms, the “intimacy model”, that helped Greek 
society to be at home with nature and with each other. As we have just finished the 
conference on “Art and World Religions”, what would be your opinion about the 
prospects of art in the 21st century? Would you see art as one of the main “healing 
powers”?
TK: I think that there is a tremendous possibility with art but that art can lose its 
way just as easily as philosophy did. Art can become just a fractured, disjointed, 
disconnected, sparking response to every stimulus that comes by. That would give it a 
lifetime of nanoseconds and give us a glimpse of the world that is gone by the time the 
paint is dry. That is one kind of art – art so subjective that the observer feels that there is 
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no content there at all that has to be somehow listened to, but rather that the artwork 
itself is just another blinking neon sign pointing me in one direction that I can accept or 
reject and go off elsewhere any which way I want. If I do not like this piece of art, I turn 
to that piece of art, like changing the channels with the remote control on the television. 
Art can be all that and serve no useful function in ways that we were talking about in 
setting values for the 21st century. It could be the product of the 21st century and not 
something that drives the 21st century. Because the 21st century lends itself to this 
instantaneous gratification, we could have the aesthetic pleasure that lasts for a moment 
and then is gone without in any way trying to find something deeper in some  values 
behind it.
On the other hand, art can be quite the opposite: art can search for those deepest 
resonances that come with understanding the artistic tradition up to now. This does not 
mean just being bound by that tradition, but also being responsive to the new conditions 
that we find ourselves in, in our present situation. In each case the past, the present and 
the future all come together, in the moment of the artist’s setting the brush to canvas or 
the musician’s writing the first note of the concerto, or the poet’s first finding the words 
that spark the writing of the poem. In that moment there is the connectedness of the past, 
the present and the future. I fear today sometimes that art and certain kinds of 
philosophical criticism can be so busy deconstructing the past that they never listen to 
the past. However, that is not the real deconstruction, because you have to first take the 
construction, make it your own and only then deconstruct it. Only then you know the 
value of that on which you are building, even as you are deconstructing the 
manifestation of that in the past.
In Lithuania you have passed, hopefully forever, the period of Soviet art, the kind of 
art that serves only a preconceived ideological function. That leaves a vacuum. Nobody 
tells you what the ideology is that you are to serve: do you develop a new ideology? Or 
do you see art as in itself so creative that ideology reflects art rather than art reflects 
ideology? All of these are now open issues in a place like Lithuania. It will be very 
interesting to see whether art will lead us into the 21st century or whether it has so lost 
its soul that all it can do is to produce something like posthumous convulsions, mere 
neurological sparks left over from the past tradition, and a jerky, incoherent, 
unvisionary sense of the future. Which path will be taken is left to the generation of 
Lithuanian artists in the next decade or two. 
AG: Your comment sounds rather Benjaminian to me; I mean his dictum that when 
art becomes secularized, when it frees itself from religion it inevitably falls into the lap 
of ideology, that it is very difficult for the art to be completely ideology-free. Let us 
turn now from art to religion for a while. Vytautas Kavolis has written an article called 
“The Humanisation of Morality and the ‘Return of the Sacred’”. What would you think 
will be the role of religions – institutionalized or non-institutionalized – in the future 
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world? Will morality become “humanized,” secularized and based on universal human 
rights, globalized and unified throughout the nations, separating itself from any 
particular religion?
TK: The problem with religion is that its institutions very often reflect an aura that 
has been dead for a very long time. The institutional structures that religion finds itself 
entrapped in often become something that can no longer enliven. Instead those 
structures become a way to reinforce some status quo with all its reactionary aspects. 
On the other hand, when we think about the spirituality that led religious institutions, 
the religious spirit that was behind the original formation of those institutions, can that 
spirit be once again enlivened to generate new kinds of institutions and new kinds of 
values and new kinds of contexts? In English we have a saying: “To throw away the 
baby with the bath water”. The spiritual impulse is that baby, just new-born, innocent, 
but capable of developing in such different ways. The dirty bath water is the water of 
religious institutions that has to be thrown away and renewed so that the baby once 
again can be itself and go out into the world clean and fresh, but yet still bringing with it 
some genetics and some of its past history and tradition. Religion has to be reborn into 
new kinds of religious institutions to suit the 21st century. The same way as art has to 
find new kinds of expressions, so religion has to find new kinds of expression. And as 
we saw in the conference, going back to the question of where art comes from and 
where religion comes from, there is a meeting point. So the sources for both religion 
and art are intimately related and discovering the source of one can very often lead to 
discovering the source of the other. In this way the task of going back to the inspiration 
at the beginning – of either art or religion – can be very much a joint enterprise.
AG: Thank you very much for your interview! 
TK: It was my pleasure! 
October 24, 2004
Kaunas – Hill of the Crosses – Kaunas (Lithuania) 
